War and Peace and Drones

Domestic factors are shaping Russia's strategy towards Ukraine

(Russia’s May 9 Victory Parade; Reuters)

On Sunday, President Trump took to Truth Social to criticize Vladimir Putin in response to massive Russian drone and missile strikes that killed twelve civilians in Ukrainian cities.  He did so in typical Trumpian fashion, claiming that “Putin has gone absolutely crazy.” The post reflects serious frustrations with the Russians by Trump and his team as negotiating efforts appear to have stalled. In turn, it’s important to understand why the Russians launched one of the largest airstrikes of the war when they did. 

Putin’s weekend strike, which comprised approximately 370 drones and missiles, was carefully calibrated for domestic and international audiences. Domestically, the attack was a message to significant pro-war elements within the Russian state that despite negotiations, head-of-state phone calls, and even international summits (should they occur), the war will continue. First among those reluctant to end the war is the military apparatus, encompassing both the commissioned hierarchy and the grunts on the front line. A series of recent interviews and reports among Russian troops on the line of contact reflect a reluctance to end the war with the four formally annexed territories of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia still in Ukrainian hands. The main theme is sacrifice - most of those interviewed expressed an unwillingness for a peace deal that ignores the sacrifices of the (many) casualties the Russian Army has taken to date. With most of the mobilized troops from September 2022 presumably out of the fight, the majority of Russian troops in Ukraine are volunteers making attractive salaries. More cynical beneficiaries are the officer corps, who are benefiting from a swollen defense budget and a marked increase in regime prestige. (Getting blown up by the SBU remains a risk.) Regardless, ending the war on a milquetoast deal that perhaps reopens international economic connections at the price of abandoning further gains in Ukraine would likely open Putin to a wave of internal criticism.  

This is a change from what I argued in February, when I emphasized Russia’s dependency on China and stated that “Putin now possesses sufficient territory to declare victory in Ukraine regardless of the actual outcome.” Given events since then and the above murmurings of discontent, I now believe that Putin’s legitimacy is firmly staked on fully controlling those four annexed territories, although leaving at least one of them contested may be an opportune way to justify restarting the war at a later date. Declaring victory without them may not lead to regime overthrow but would seriously weaken Putin’s credibility with the public and especially among the armed forces and security services. As such, an outcome negotiated by the Kremlin under current conditions that doesn’t integrate the four territories fully into Russia would have to contain other stipulations grotesquely in Russia’s favor. Simply put: getting back to pre-February 2022 international conditions (excluding the rupture with Europe) but with a little more of Ukraine attached to Russia is not an outcome commensurate with the casualties, expenditures, and justificatory output the regime has experienced in the past three years. The Kremlin knows this, and the strike can also be considered as a message to the Russian nationalist-right, popular in the Telegram sphere, who have expended considerable energy criticizing the war effort.  

The strike was likely also a signal to others within Russia, both inside and outside the state, who have benefited from the conflict. These include traditional players such as the security services and newer ones such as the many defense contractors and industrial firms who have benefited from the enormous increase in military spending. The former have played a key role in policing Fortress Russia in the post-2022 crackdown and deepening Russia’s shadow war with Europe. The latter have almost single handedly propped up and transformed Russia’s sanctioned economy while making a tidy sum in the process, something which will be looked at in more detail below. 

Internationally, the attack probably aimed to reinforce harsh Russian demands at the negotiating table in Istanbul while upholding Russia’s perception of strength. Nonetheless, the strike was not beneficial to Russia’s attempted courting of Trump, who responded with the aforementioned outburst. Putin’s team is likely to have concluded that while the legitimacy afforded Russia internationally and domestically by high-profile discussions between the two Presidents and their teams is attractive, it doesn’t outweigh domestic political imperatives. 

Putin’s decision to continue the war reflects that getting Russia off a war footing may prove more threatening to regime stability than prolonging the war. Two perceived dangers make this especially clear. The first is the potential challenge posed by the demobilization of veterans. As a report from ISWS describes in detail, the Kremlin has made a concerted effort to control the reintegration and political mobility of veterans returning from the war. Now numbering hundreds of thousands, often with criminal backgrounds and frequently traumatized, disenchanted veterans pose a serious threat to Russian social stability. To cite briefly from the report: “The Kremlin is intensifying a campaign launched in late 2022 and early 2023 to prevent the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society and an influx of alienated veterans in Russia likely because it perceives the demobilization of Russian veterans as a potential threat to regime stability.” Putin is keen to avoid a repeat of the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan war, when many returning soldiers put their skills to use for criminal ends. Similarly, the demise of the USSR, the Chechen Wars, and the chaos of the 1990s saw the rise of popular soldier-politicians such as Alexander Lebed, a scenario Putin and the broader Kremlin aristocracy are also eager to nullify. (Incidentally, Lebed, once Russia’s most popular politician and a potential presidential candidate, died in a helicopter crash in 2002. Odd.) 

The newly created and highly publicized “Time of Heroes” program, which gives select veterans of the SVO administrative training and implants them within regional and Kremlin ministries, can thus be seen as an attempt to channel high-performing veterans into Kremlin-controlled verticals of power. Amidst the grunts, disenchantment would also be intensified with an unsatisfactory conclusion to the war, and some returning veterans have already been used politically by figures such as Russian nationalist Igor “Strelkov” Girkin and VDV Commander General Mikhail Teplinsky. The Kremlin has attempted to address the threat through several programs, namely a variety of state-backed veterans associations that toe the official line. The seriousness with which the Kremlin appears to be taking the problem now reflects how much more troubling an influx of veterans would be with any large-scale demobilization. Such a demobilization would also pose a serious economic risk, which leads us to the second perceived danger of ending the war. 

(Putin at a “Time of Heroes” Ceremony; Jamestown)

The Russian economy has undergone a structural change driven by the huge increase in military spending. Defense factories producing tanks, missiles, and drones are running around the clock, driving almost all of the economy’s growth and wage gains over the past three years. This relative economic stability, although endangered by high inflation, has helped keep the population relatively pacified. Between the substantial payments to volunteers in the SVO and various supporting industries, Russia’s war economy has seen a large-scale redistribution of wealth to traditionally neglected rural regions. As a result, several problems stand out that would make any transition away from a war economy painful. The first is that aside from defense-associated industries, the rest of the economy appears to be entering a recession. This can be pinned down variously to labour shortages, the prohibitive cost of borrowing, which remains at 21%, and the crowding out of social and other forms of spending in favour of military expenditures. A turn away from the main sphere of growth (defense) could help redistribute spending more evenly, but it would also remove the only sector that has kept Russian economic growth positive amongst sanctions. Per the WSJ: “It is absolutely imperative for Russia to continue to rely on the military industry, because it [has] become the driver of economic growth,” said Alexander Kolyandr, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. “For a while, it will be next to impossible for Russia to reduce military spending.” Total military expenditure was approximately 37% of the Russian budget in 2025. 

The second challenge to a shift away from a war footing is that Russia’s traditional economic line of defense, energy sales, is also in a period of downturn. Oil prices remain lower than the Kremlin needs to balance its budget, and the situation is unlikely to improve with European markets shut off and OPEC increasing production. In summary, while the Russian economy possesses undeniable structural weaknesses and is unlikely to experience continued high growth, the uncertainty of restructuring a post-war economy is at a minimum just as unfavorable to Putin as continuing down the current path. Stagnation is better than recession or collapse. Countries can and have in the past navigated their economies toward post-defense spending environments, but it is a difficult transition. 

Meanwhile, the battlefield situation remains somewhat fluid. Russia continues to make slow advances while suffering heavy casualties. Russian progress, at about sixteen square miles a week, actually appears diminished compared to this time last year. Russian casualties have remained steady. While high, these are replenishable given Russia’s demographic base and the steady recruitment of volunteers attracted to high salaries. The Russians did succeed (with North Korean help) in clearing the Ukrainians out of Kursk, and are now attempting to establish a buffer zone in the Ukrainian border region of Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainians have major problems of their own. These are threefold. First is the continued manpower drain on the front line. Ukraine’s smaller demographic base and reluctance to draft under-25s means units remain without leave, and morale appears to be dropping amidst continued command and corruption issues. Second is Ukraine’s lack of air defense and the growing presence of Russian drones. Pro-Russian blogger Simplicus has detailed these problems in depth. (Despite his jingoism, Simplicus corroborates most of his claims with Western and Ukrainian reports. Retain some skepticism for anything unsupported regardless.) In summary, the Ukrainians are running out of ammunition to counter the large scale drone and missile strikes Russia is launching. In addition, major systems such as the Patriot are struggling to intercept modified Russian missiles. On the front line, Russian drone swarms are increasingly matching Ukrainian ones, preventing Ukrainian vehicles from accessing the front line and forcing troops to trudge kilometers in the dark on foot just to get where they need to be. The third problem is tied to the second: U.S. aid is drying up. Per Marco Rubio’s recent testimony, the U.S. has resorted to scrounging for air-defense systems among allies, and Trump has yet to sign off on any further aid packages. He is unlikely to do so, meaning the Ukrainians are likely to have to rely solely on Europe and their domestic industry for military materiel, both of which pale in comparison to Russian military-industrial production. I believe that Trump and Rubio may allow the Ukrainians to continue to receive intelligence, but that doesn’t fix the Ukrainian ammunition problem. So while the Ukrainians aren’t at risk of imminent collapse, their position looks increasingly brittle. Bad demographics remain the unsolvable strategic dilemma. To quote one defense analyst, “The fat man grows thinner. But the thin man dies.” In line with historical precedent, the Russians can afford to take a beating. 

Given these factors, it’s unsurprising Putin is stalling at the negotiating table and prolonging the war. As I elaborated in February, Putin does have some incentives towards peace, although I greatly overstated the importance of international economic opportunities to his decision-making. Reducing the dependency on China likely remains desirable to the Russians, although a victory of some sort in Ukraine paired with a large and battle-tested army could do the trick in balancing the relationship. Engaging in summits with Team USA enhances Russian credibility at home and abroad, and we may indeed still see a summit between Putin and Trump. Furthermore, Putin is maintaining the current path as long as battlefield conditions allow. If the Russian army finds little success this summer, the establishment of a negotiating framework the past few months means a viable off-ramp does exist. Ultimately, negotiations and the battlefield state of play will be dependent on what Putin thinks he can accomplish in the field. Domestic political and economic factors, the price of oil, China’s stance, American pressure on Russia, and aid to Ukraine will also play a role. If the U.S. cuts aid to Ukraine and the Ukrainian army fractures, Putin will go for as much territory as he can. If Russia’s summer offensive fails Putin will be forced to reassess his goals of seizing all of the annexed territories, though he may well be content to continue a war of attrition until Ukraine eventually cracks. Regardless, the ball is very much in Moscow’s court. 

(Predicting Kremlin politics is hard and predicting Trump is harder. I overestimated the likelihood of negotiations succeeding in February, so take any predictions I’ve made with a grain of salt.)