Who's playing the “Great Game?”

Personnel choices reveal the global stakes of U.S. - Russia negotiations

As Marco Rubio, Steve Witkoff, and Michael Waltz head to Saudi Arabia, it’s worth considering the broader implications of Trump’s talks with Putin. The selection of personnel on both sides already reveals that the intended focus of negotiations likely extends far beyond ending the war in Ukraine.

Keith Kellogg, Special Envoy for Russia and Ukraine

(Kyiv Post; Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

Trump’s exclusion of Keith Kellogg, nominally the Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia, from the negotiating table in Riyadh is revealing in more ways than one. Given his (publicly available) activities and recent media appearances, Kellogg appears to have been relegated to dealing with the Ukrainians and selling/coaxing/intimidating them into whatever deal emerges from the top. While Ukrainian interests in some form will be represented at the negotiation table, those interests will ultimately be set within a pre-existing framework devised in Riyadh. Any leeway the Ukrainians get in determining the end of the war will also be dependent on their acquiescence or lack thereof to external American demands (read: crucial minerals). In short: the end to the war and future of the post-war order will be determined largely by American and Russian negotiators. As for the Europeans? Lacking much leverage, they’ll have to play along as the hot potato (some would say live grenade) of Ukraine’s post-war security is thrown into their lap.

Kellogg’s absence from the top team is also revealing by way of showing that Trump and his aides are thinking about Russia-U.S. relations more broadly than simply ending the war in Ukraine. As senior policymakers, Rubio and Waltz may have the objective to improve relations with Russia and consequently weaken the Sino-Russian alliance. Although the intellectual basis for such an approach has already been laid by individuals such as Thomas Graham, Trump and his negotiators likely understand the premise on a basic level. Trump’s positive personal relationship with Putin is no secret, and their recent phone call covered ground well beyond the war in Ukraine. Trump’s personal and political ambivalence to China, centered on trade, manufacturing, and fentanyl, does not extend to Putin’s Russia. In turn, Putin’s personnel choices indicate that he is eager to lessen sanctions and improve economic relations with the United States - and perhaps reduce Russia’s wartime dependency on China.

Putin’s team mirrors the American one reputationally. Early reporting indicates Putin’s chief foreign policy advisor, Yuri Ushakov, SVR Chief, Sergei Naryshkin, and Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, will lead the Russian team. The potential participation of Naryshkin, who appeared visibly uncertain about supporting Putin’s plan to invade Ukraine in 2022, may indicate Putin’s appreciation for a more nuanced view than could be provided by more hawkish figures such as FSB director Bortnikov or the now-demoted Nikolai Patrushev. Regardless, much as with Trump’s team, the most interesting pick is at a lower level than Naryshkin and Ushakov.

The inclusion of Kirill Dmitriev, the Harvard-and-Stanford educated head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, likely indicates that Putin hopes for an economic re-approachment beyond peace negotiations. Per CNN, Dmitriev has been tasked with restoring economic relations with the U.S. This will likely take two tracks: the lifting of various sanctions on Russian companies and particularly Russia’s reconnection to the world financial system, and the actual resumption of trade between Russia and the U.S. The former will likely be Russia’s main focus given the minute size of Russia-U.S. trade pre-2022. Dmitriev is a relatively recent addition to Russia’s negotiating apparatus, and may have been given the role of brokering the recent release of American hostage Marc Fogel to build his stature with America’s top negotiators. In addition to being a businessman, he is also, per CNN, an “outspoken Trump supporter from within Russia’s elite”, further aiding his image with his American counterparts.

Kirill Dmitriev, Head of Russia’s Direct Investment Fund

(Arabian Business)

Putin’s inclusion of Dmitriev is likely a response to two key problems facing Russia: the fragile state of the Russian economy and an unequal dependency on China. Predictions of the imminent collapse of the Russian economy have been routine since 2022, and this piece will not make one. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the Russian economic situation will continue to deteriorate the longer the war continues. Inflation remains stubbornly high despite 21% interest rates, which have throttled non-military investment. While some have made out handsomely in the war economy, a serious labor shortage remains unresolved, and enormous military-security government spending is unsustainable in the long term. Add to this a dependency on sanctions-capped oil prices and stagnation increasingly looks like a favorable outcome. Per Reuters, Putin has grown increasingly concerned regarding the economic situation, and it appears that Trump received some intelligence to this effect following his inauguration.

Pair this weakness with Russia’s evident subordination to China in the economic realm and Putin has serious incentives to look to Trump for economic relief. In theory, Russia and China remain close partners. Their strategic relationship, predicated on a shared dislike of the Western liberal order, will be a practical reality for decades to come. China has played a crucial role in helping Russia survive its exit from European markets and the world financial system. Russia has oriented its economy eastwards since 2022, with China now by far its largest trading partner. Russia exports large amounts of energy to China and in-turn imports everything from cars to cookware.

Nonetheless, this closeness belays the reality that to call the relationship lopsided would be an understatement. China, which is Russia’s largest energy importer, only buys Russian energy at well-below market prices, and it imports little else. Chinese manufacturers have flooded Russian markets. Given sanctions and Russia’s dubious legal environment, Russia has become increasingly dependent on Chinese investors for external investment. In Russia’s Far East, where development over critical sectors such as mining and infrastructure used to be off-limits to Chinese investors, more than 90% of Foreign Direct Investment is Chinese. Chinese companies dominate the Russian automobile (40% share) and smartphone (70% share) markets. China has also garnered increasing influence in Central Asia, traditionally Russia’s stomping grounds, although it is careful to heed Russian interests in the region. Nonetheless, Russia’s current economic dependency on China is historically unprecedented - and comes when Russia’s traditional military role in the relationship is a hollow shell of itself.

The Russia-China relationship was until 2022 governed by the basic maxim that while China was undeniably the economic heavyweight, Russia made itself valuable by maintaining its military edge and expertise. Given both the poor (relative to expectations) performance of Russia’s forces in Ukraine and the accompanying enormous losses of men and material, that dynamic has very much left Russia the lesser of the two, rhetorical proclamations of equality be damned. Putin was visibly frustrated when a journalist quizzed him on Russia becoming the “junior partner” in the relationship, insisting that they remained equals. Add to this that the history of Russian-Chinese relations is not one of friendship, something Putin and the Russian elite are well aware of. Russia and China fought a border war within living memory, Russian officers were wargaming a Chinese invasion of Siberia as recently as 2014, and grumbles from within the Russian elite about the relationship emerge periodically.

This dynamic means that Putin’s motivations in negotiations extend beyond declaring victory in Ukraine. Putin may have succumbed to what Russia scholar Thomas Graham dubbed “Messianism” in deciding to invade, but his strategic decision-making prior to 2022 was relatively shrewd, and he certainly wants more parity in the relationship with China. Given Europe will remain a no-go zone for Russia for the foreseeable future, rebuilding relations somewhat with the United States is the easiest way to accomplish that. Trade with the U.S. will neither fully balance China nor replace closed European markets, but reducing or eliminating worldwide financial, energy, and trade sanctions will ease some of the pressure on the Russian economy and open avenues beyond Tiananmen. As presented at a closed-door Russian strategy session in April, Russia’s long-term plan for economic relevance is dependent on the creation of a Eurasian trade bloc “that would aim to rival the US, EU, and China’s spheres of economic influence." Russian policy-makers have acknowledged that the plan, which relies on deepening connections to Central Asia and the Global South, has been considerably hindered by U.S. sanctions towards Russian partners. The Russians will doubtless want America to lift those restrictions.

(German Council on Foreign Relations; Stephan Barisitz, Austrian National Bank)

The implications for the upcoming negotiations follow from this context. First, as already evidenced by the appointment of Dmitriev, economic considerations will play a considerable role in Putin’s negotiating strategy, perhaps second only to the question of Ukraine’s NATO membership. Given that Putin now possesses sufficient territory to declare victory in Ukraine regardless of the actual outcome and the generalized apathy of ordinary Russians to the political circumstances of the conflict, he may prioritize post-war economic stability for the sake of preserving his own rule. This narrow focus is likely to be supplemented by a broader desire for economic diversification as a way of balancing Russia’s dependency on China. The combination of these two factors means that American negotiators may have more leeway, and opportunity, with the Russians than they assume.

The new U.S. administration also has two advantages when it comes to producing a lasting agreement with Russia that its predecessors did not. The following is not a moral judgement but a realistic analysis of why their “reset” with the Russians may prove more successful than previous attempts. First, ditching the strident emphasis on human rights concerns that have largely framed U.S.-Russia policy for the past two decades gives the U.S. a higher degree of flexibility in its abilities to meet the Russians halfway. Second, the Trump administration’s avowed focus on geopolitical expansionism (Greenland, Panama) will likely reassure the Russians - eternally distrustful of the true intentions of American policymaking - of American “goodwill” in negotiations. After all, it’s very clear this administration is avowedly “America first” and thus interested in making a lasting, self-beneficial deal. To the Russians, now that the Americans are being honest about their negotiating stance, the Russians can do what they do best - realpolitik with realist counterparts. The inevitable clash between an American post Cold-War, values-based foreign policy and the Russian realism described by Graham can be alleviated if America drops what Russia believes to be the values masquerade.

In short, the upcoming negotiations in Saudi have considerable implications for the future of U.S. - Russia relations and the geopolitical balance in Eurasia. Ukraine is not going to receive NATO membership, and while it will want something in return for natural resources, it is hard to imagine Trump extending binding security guarantees. Assistance in rebuilding the Ukrainian economy and armed forces is more likely. An ad-hoc solution tying Ukraine to Europe may be the most plausible scenario. In exchange for an end to the war and its associated costs, expect economic variables extending far beyond Ukraine to play an important role. Russia will keep the territory it presently controls, and with a status-quo peace (and perhaps a Trump visit to Moscow) will be able to declare victory while beginning the process of re-asserting itself economically in Eurasia. The U.S. team may be explicit in their desire to degrade the Russia-China relationship or they may be subtle, but the objective will be there all the same. Given realpolitik is the order of the day, there is ample room for both sides to emerge with a favorable agreement. Ukraine and Europe will be less pleased. Russia’s strategic position will remain far worse than pre-invasion, but that is a subject for another day.

Of course, there are a million scenarios that run counter to this one. Putin is an elderly KGB-nik surrounded by other elderly KGB-niks. While fond of Trump, his distrust of the West will accompany him to his grave. While this Trump administration does really appear radically different to its first incarnation, it's worth remembering that U.S. Russia relations worsened considerably during Trump round one. Marco Rubio’s neoconservative background may result in Ukraine making out better than expected. Elements of the Russian elite are doubtless profiting off of Russia’s turn eastwards and may make their views felt. China is one of Russia’s few “true” friends in the international arena, and any balancing that does occur is likely to be subtle.

Regardless of the negotiating outcome, China and Russia will remain close for the foreseeable future. Much else could also impact the ultimate result. The information Putin receives from his military commanders, while probably less warped than it was in 2022, likely remains misguided, and he may be determined to prolong the war if negotiations don’t match his expectations. Trump may grow frustrated with Russian stubbornness and escalate (something that will doubtless be conveyed to the Russian side in Riyadh.) Ukraine’s position in Kursk will probably be a major stumbling block, given that Russia can’t end the war with it in Ukrainian hands and Ukraine will be extremely reluctant to give up a prized negotiating piece. Russia’s economy may finally collapse and weaken Putin’s hand. All or one of these factors may derail negotiations.

Nonetheless, it is more likely than not that something material results from these talks in the next six months. Being aware of the personnel and policy context provides a mechanism to assess the prospective outcome.

(The views expressed in this post are solely my own.)